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Abstract. This study integrates development aid into a theoretically founded structural
gravity model that considers primary and secondary effects of aid as an income transfer
and as a bilateral trade cost determinant. We identify the parameters of our model using a
two-stage approach that includes a state-of-the-art Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
gravity estimation for a sample of 132 countries over the period 1995 to 2012. The main
findings indicate that bilateral aid only increases bilateral trade for countries that do
not have a common language, a past colonial relationship or an RTA. On average, 1
USD of additional foreign aid from all donors increases recipients’ net imports by around
0.36 USD. Our comparative statics indicate that donors experience a reduction in real
consumption due to aid and recipients an increase. We also analyze the effect on third
countries. The modelling framework also applies to the study of other transfers such as
remittances.
Résumé. Les transferts dans l’équation de gravité. Cette étude contribue à la littérature
sur le lien entre l’aide au développement et le commerce international en intégrant
l’aide dans un modèle structurel de gravité avec des fondations théorétiques. Nous
pouvons alors mener une analyse plus compète des gains à l’échange découlant de
l’aide. On identie les paramètres de notre modèle de manière empirique en utilisant
une approche en deux étapes comprenant une estimation de gravité avec la dernière
version du pseudo maximum de vraisemblance de Poisson pour un échantillon de 132
pays et la période 1995 à 2012. Nos résultats principaux suggèrent que l’aide bilatérale
augmente le commerce entre le donneur et le bénéficiaire seulement en absence de
langue commune, de relation coloniale passée ou d’accords bilatéraux et régionaux. En
outre, un dollar supplémentaire d’aide de tous les donneurs augmente les importations
nettes de 0,36 dollar. Notre statique comparative suggère que, malgré les effets sur les
coûts commerciaux, les donneurs subissent une réduction de la consommation réelle et
les bénéficiaires une augmentation due à l’aide. De plus, on analyse les effets sur les pays
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tiers. Bien que cette étude concerne l’aide au développement, le cadre de modélisation
se prête également à l’analyse d’autres genres de transferts comme l’envoi de fonds.
JEL classification: F14, F35
1. IntroductionF
F oreign development aid provides important monetary resources formany low-income countries. On average, low- and lower-middle income
countries receive aid worth around 3% of their respective GDP. In some
extreme cases (such as Tuvalu after 2008 or Guinea-Bissau in 1996) aid is
around 50% of GDP. Palau even received aid worth more than twice its GDP
in 1994, the year of its independence.
In order to understand the effect that development aid and other inter-
national transfers can have on macroeconomic performance, it is important
to study their effect on recipients’ trade flows. First, for any nominal transfer
to have a real effect, it would have to increase net imports relative to domestic
production, given that, for aid to be absorbed, either the consumption of goods
or services, investment or government expenditure has to increase (Temple
and Van de Sijpe 2017). Second, it is well documented (Trionfetti 2018) that,
in the presence of trade costs, any transfer can have secondary terms of
trade effects beyond primary income effects. Third, numerous studies show
that development aid specifically is often not impartial but linked to higher
bilateral trade between recipient and donor (Wagner 2003, Silva and Nelson
2012, Pettersson and Johansson 2013, Martínez-Zarzoso 2015). This, in turn,
can counteract the secondary effects stemming from aid. Finally, aid may
benefit (or harm) third countries. For instance, countries that trade intensively
with recipients may benefit from additional demand due to aid.
Our study integrates development aid into a structural gravity model and
incorporates all four of the aforementioned aspects. In doing so, it presents a
more complete analysis of the beneficiaries of aid transfers—recipients, donors
or third countries—and the extent to which they profit.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we develop an
extension of the theoretical gravity model à la Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) that considers aid as a transfer and distinguishes between aggregate
and bilateral effects of aid. As such, we perform a two-stage analysis, where aid
first increases aggregate demand and hence net imports and, in a second stage,
aid may additionally affect bilateral imports by changing bilateral trade costs.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of aid
on bilateral trade using a state-of-the-art Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
estimator with the full set of fixed effects demanded by theory. Finally, the
use of the structural gravity model allows us to calculate comparative statics
and to gauge the export and real consumption effects of aid on recipients,
donors and third countries, including the primary and secondary effects of a
transfer in a similar way to Dekle et al. (2007).
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In our empirical analysis, we find a robust effect of aggregate development
aid on aggregate net imports of goods of around 0.36 USD per 1 USD of
development aid. We find positive and significant effects of bilateral aid on
bilateral imports only in the absence of other historical, cultural or political
ties (measured by past colonial relationship, common language and RTA
participation) after controlling for aggregate and general equilibrium effects.
Our general equilibrium analysis suggests that on average recipients benefit
from the trade effects of aid. Although the burden for donors is reduced by the
positive bilateral effects of aid on donors’ exports, the total income and terms
of trade effects are negative and in net terms donors give more than they
receive, which is in accordance with the main goal of development aid. Some
third countries gain from demand effects, mostly if they are net exporters to
aid recipients and net importers from donors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the existing literature. In section 3, we present the augmented
gravity model and derive the partial and general equilibrium effects of aid.
Bilateral effects are added in section 3.2. Section 4 discusses the empirical
implementation of the two-stage model, and section 4.1 describes the method
used to calculate comparative statics. In section 5, we describe the data sources
used for our estimation (5.1), present the main empirical results (5.2), carry
out some robustness checks (5.3) and report the estimates for the general
equilibrium effects (5.4). Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2. Literature review
Our paper is related to three broad strands of the literature concerning de-
velopment aid or, more generally, transfers and their effect on trade.
First, our paper feeds into the literature on the transfer problem. As in
much of this literature, the mechanism at play in our model comprises income
and terms of trade effects. According to many studies, terms of trade effects
arise due to differences in expenditure shares between the donor and the
recipient of a transfer. For instance, Dixit (1983) provides a framework for
studying the effects of transfers in a model with third countries, homogeneous
goods and frictionless trade. He deems transfer paradoxes—where donors
gain due to the secondary effects—mere theoretical possibilities. Brakman
and van Marrewijk (1995) study tied and untied aid in a two-country world
with monopolistic competition in the manufactured goods sector. They show
theoretically that tying aid can reduce the loss for the donor and the benefit
for the recipient. Finally, in Trionfetti (2018)—as in this study—terms of trade
effects arise due to trade costs. Trionfetti (2018) studies the effect of transfers
in the context of monopolistic competition, trade frictions and heterogeneous
firms. He demonstrates that welfare effects beyond the income and terms of
trade effects may occur.
The second strand of literature empirically studies the extent to which
aid increases expenditure and leads to higher domestic absorption and net
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imports. For instance, applying a dynamic generalized methods of moments
model, Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) find that in the short run 30% of aid is
absorbed, while the figure increases to 83% in the long run. Using a vector
autoregression model, Hansen and Headey (2010) find absorption ratios close
to 40% for small developing countries. Werker et al. (2009) use an instrumental
variable approach based on windfall gains from the oil crises. They find that
receiving aid leads to a significant increase in imports and has no effect on
exports for Muslim-majority countries. Werker et al. (2009) report similar
findings for a larger set of countries using a common correlated effects model
with instrumental variables. Moreover, they show that most of the increase
in absorption translates into higher levels of consumption. Berg et al. (2015),
in a theoretical contribution, study the role of independent central banks and
exchange rate regimes in aid absorption.
Third, there are numerous studies investigating the extent to which aid
helps promote the donor’s exports to the recipient. One channel discussed
above can be tied aid (Brakman and van Marrewijk 1995), which helps reduce
the donor’s costs. Djajic et al. (2004) go beyond that and argue that, due
to habit formation, giving aid could serve the commercial interests of the
donor in future periods. The empirical studies that focus on bilateral effects
suggest that aid leads recipient countries to source more imports from donor
countries and, hence, increases donors’ exports. Djajic et al. (2004) was the
first author to estimate a gravity model of trade augmented with foreign
aid for European Union donors. He finds a positive and significant bilateral
effect of development aid. Wagner (2003) extends the approach to evaluate
aid given by OECD countries. Adding bilateral fixed effects to control for
unobserved trade costs, he finds a smaller effect than Nilsson (1997), but it
remains positive and significant. Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) estimate the
effect of German aid on German exports using a dynamic OLS framework to
account for endogeneity. Like the previous studies, they obtain positive and
statistically significant results. Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2016) study the effect
of German aid on German sectoral exports and find the highest effect for
machinery, electrical equipment and transport equipment.
These studies employing the gravity equation treat bilateral development
aid as a trade cost determinant. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that
the gravity equation provides biased estimates for trade cost determinants if
multilateral resistance to trade is not controlled for. Silva and Nelson (2012)
address this issue by using a log-linear approximation of these multilateral
resistance terms (MRT) proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2009). They too
find positive and significant results. Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) include
multilateral and third-country aid, and use bilateral, country and year fixed
effects to account for unobserved trade cost determinants and multilateral
resistance terms. They use a sample of DAC donors and find heterogeneous ef-
fects of bilateral aid on donor exports. They find that positive effects are more
prevalent in the group of donors with a higher share of tied aid. Also, they find
no evidence of adverse effects on third countries’ exports except for EU donors.
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The problem of zero bilateral aid flows is another key issue in this literature.
Most studies use a log-linearized gravity model with the log of aid on the
right-hand side. This implies that observations with zero aid will be dropped.
One remedy is to add a small amount to all aid flows. Wagner (2003) argues
against this practice because it is not well defined what constitutes a small
amount. Instead, he includes a zero-aid dummy. Hansen and Rand (2014)
provide another solution similar to the expansion factor that our model below
yields. In a robustness check they argue that if aid affects exports through





the zero-aid problem. They study the effect of Danish aid on Danish exports.
Their findings suggest that the effect of aid on exports is on average lower when
using this approach and that it varies less across recipient countries. The effect
is still positive and significant. Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2017) obtain similar
results for the Dutch case.
None of the papers listed, however, provide a theoretical framework that
integrates aid as a transfer in a structural gravity model; nor do any of
those papers take into account the positive demand effect of aid going to
neighbouring countries. We provide such a framework and allow for income
and terms of trade effects, as discussed in the literature on the transfer
problem, as well as trade cost effects of aid. In section 3.1, we show that as an
income transfer aid has general equilibrium repercussions that are different
from pure trade cost determinants. As a consequence, the welfare implications
will differ from those reported in standard applications. We model trade cost
effects stemming from bilateral aid projects. As a result, our empirical model
unifies the approach of Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) and Hansen and Rand
(2014) and allows for a more detailed and theory-consistent welfare analysis.
3. Structural gravity with transfers
3.1. Aggregate effects
We use a modified version of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model to
study the effects of transfers on bilateral trade. The same logic extends to the
larger class of models described by Arkolakis et al. (2012). First, we briefly
review the standard gravity model of trade. In a second step, we study the
role that transfers play within that framework.
We assume there are N countries each producing one unique product under
monopolistic competition. As in Yotov et al. (2016), we take the quantity of
production Qit as given. Then, each country i’s production value at time t
is given by yit = pitQit, where yit = GDPit and pit is the producer price—or
factory gate price—that countries receive when selling their product. More-
over, let Eit denote country i’s total expenditure. At this stage, we make no
assumption as to its relation to yit. This expenditure is allocated towards
goods from different countries of origin according to a CES utility function
with homothetic preferences:










where cijt is the consumption of country i’s good in country j.1 βi > 0 is a
distributional parameter. σ is the elasticity of substitution. The representative
consumer maximizes equation (1) subject to the budget constraint Ejt =∑
i pijtcijt. pijt is the price of the good exported from country i to country
j. Assuming iceberg trade costs, this reduces to pijt = pitτijt, where τijt > 1
are trade costs. We denote by xijt ≡pijtcijt the amount that the consumer in
country j spends on the product from country i; that is, the value of bilateral













)1−σ] 11−σ is the theoretical price index. Finally,
market income of country i, yit, is obtained by selling the domestic product at
home and abroad; that is, it equals the sum of all bilateral exports and internal
trade. The market clearing condition ensures that market income equals the
value of production (GDP) yit =
∑
j xijt. After making this final assumption,











































i yit denotes world GDP. Πit is the outward multilateral re-
sistance term and measures overall trade costs that the exporters face. It is
derived from the market-clearing condition and inversely related to factory
gate prices pit. Real consumption, which is equivalent to utility under CES
preferences, is given by Ejt/Pjt. In the traditional Anderson and van Wincoop
1 All variables are defined in accordance with Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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(2003) model, the representative consumer spends all their disposable income,
which is derived from market income; that is, Eit =yDit =yit, where yDit denotes
disposable income. This assumption implies that trade is balanced. More
recent applications of the gravity model deviate from that assumption and
introduce an exogenous additive (Dekle et al. 2007) or multiplicative (Yotov
et al. 2016) term to allow for unbalanced trade.
Within this framework, now suppose there are bilateral transfers at time
t. We denote the bilateral transfers from country i to j by tfijt. If tfijt > 0
country j is a net recipient of the transfer. If tfijt <0 country j is a net donor
to country i. In turn, tfijt = −tfjit. Each country receives or gives transfers
to multiple countries. Let TFjt =
∑
i tfijt be net total aid inflows of country
j. First, we assume that the transfers are neutral with respect to trade costs;
that is, ∂τijt/∂tfijt =0. Then, TFjt is the amount by which disposable income
yDjt differs from market income yjt (GDP). Disposable income is lower than
market income if the country is a net donor (TFjt < 0) and higher if the
country is a net recipient. In order to account for the fact that not every
dollar of aid will actually reach the recipient country, let γ denote the share
of aid reaching the recipient.2 In practical terms, γ can be interpreted as the
reduced form effect of aid on net imports, encompassing indirect effects of
aid on net imports channelled through all the other items of the balance of
payments. Total expenditure is thus Ejt =yDjt =yjt +γTFjt.
The immediate effect of the transfer is that trade is no longer balanced. In




xijt −xjit =γTFjt. (8)
This equation captures the primary or income effect of the transfer, but
the structural gravity model also allows for secondary terms of trade effects
on disposable income and real consumption. According to equation (4), even
a neutral transfer affects bilateral trade beyond a proportional increase. The
transfer affects the market clearing condition of all countries and hence Πit.
Since internal trade costs are by assumption lower than all international
trade costs, Πit will rise for the donor. This implies that its factory gate
prices determined by equation (6) have to decline for markets to clear. As a
consequence, market income is reduced according to equation (7) and exports
increase according to equation (3). The higher the trade costs between the
donor and its specific recipients, the stronger this adverse terms of trade effect
2 For instance, a portion of the aid given may be designated for refugee programs
in the donor country. While this money never reaches the recipient, it is still
counted as development assistance. More importantly, it is not clear a priori
that all the aid that is sent is actually spent. It could be the case that part of it
just increases foreign currency reserves or aid could be diverted and trigger
capital exports, for example to purchase property abroad. It could also crowd in
or out other transfers. Moreover, part of the aid may be spent in the donor
country on consultants working on technical assistance projects (we thank an
anonymous referee for this latter point).
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becomes. The opposite is true for recipient countries, where imports increase.
Consequently, the transfer of real consumption exceeds the transfer of nominal
income. Additionally, third countries will be affected by the transfer, since it
implies a reduction of aggregate demand in one country and an increase in
another. Third countries that face relatively low trade costs vis-à-vis recipient
countries will be able to increase their factory gate prices, whereas those third
countries with relatively low trade costs vis-à-vis the donor country will have
to reduce their prices.
3.2. Bilateral effects
In most cases, development aid is neither unconditional nor impartial and may
have a greater effect on trade flows between a given donor and a given recipient
than on a recipient country’s imports from third countries. For donors, such
a bilateral effect would help reduce the secondary burden of the transfer and
lessen the reduction in the terms of trade (Brakman and van Marrewijk 1995).
We focus here on direct and immediate effects of aid and abstract from long-
term effects. First, aid may be explicitly tied (Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2014) in
the sense that it has to be spent on products from the donor country. Second,
irrespective of the specific form aid takes, it will involve some cooperation and
communication between donor and recipient, which in turn may have spillover
effects on the cost of other types of cooperation, for instance, trade.
We focus here on the role that aid projects implemented by the donor may
play in bilateral imports. If an agency in the donor country is responsible for
the spending of project funds, domestic suppliers in the donor country may
have an advantage. The proximity to the donor agency reduces organizational
and search costs. Hence, it allows them to supply goods used for aid projects
at lower trade costs than if the decision was made autonomously by the
recipient.3
Suppose a fraction αij of bilateral aid is project aid. Then the budget of
an aid project from j in i is αijtfÅijt, where
tfÅijt =
{
tfijt if tfijt >0,
0 otherwise. (9)
The project finances additional trade flows into j and can be spent on
goods from different countries. The difference between trade flows financed
by project aid and those financed by the recipient’s disposable income lies in
the trade costs. We assume that the project organized by country i in country
j faces trade costs τÅijt < τijt for trade flows between donor and recipient and
τijt for imports from any other country. We also assume that there is only one
project per donor.
Thus, we can write country j’s imports from any country i as the sum of
imports financed by the recipient’s disposable income on the one hand, and
3 Clay et al. (2009) suggest that such “de facto tying” is in fact prevalent in many
aid projects.
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where P ijt denotes the price index applicable to the project organized by
country i in country j. k is any country including i and j. The remaining





disposable income the recipient country can freely spend. This does not include
transfers that are linked to aid projects. This budget is spent subject to trade
costs τijt. In the second line of equation (10), we add imports financed through
aid projects.The first term within the curly brackets captures the demand
effect due to other countries’ projects in j on imports from i. The relevant
trade costs here are the same as for the hosting country j, τijt. The second
term within the curly brackets captures demand due to country i’s project in
country j, where the relevant trade costs are denoted by τÅijt.
Next, we introduce the simplifying assumption that the price index is not
notably affected by the trade costs that are preferential towards the respective


















where δijt ≡ ((τÅijt/τijt)1−σ − 1)αij . The primary effect of aid is the same as
in subsection 3.1. Aggregate net imports increase by γ with every dollar of
aid, irrespective of αij .4 Nonetheless, project aid affects the allocation of
the spending financed by aid. We therefore refer to the bilateral effect as
an allocation effect.
Note that δijt depends negatively on τÅijt/τijt. In the extreme case of τ
Å
ijt =
τijt—that is, when trade costs within the project are exactly the same as
the trade costs otherwise incurred by the country—there is no additional
effect. Only if τÅijt < τijt would we expect a partial effect of aid on bilateral
imports. Hence, if donor and recipient have comparatively low organizational
transaction costs, the effect of aid should be comparatively small.
The allocation effect implies a relationship between real consumption and
trade that differs from the aggregate effect. As explained in section 1, in the
absence of a bilateral effect, a transfer leads to an increase in donors’ exports
and recipients’ imports. This is driven by primary income and terms of trade
effects associated with a decline in factory gate prices pit. Both effects are
4 αij denotes the share of project aid in the aid budget.
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associated with a decline in donor real consumption mirrored by an increase
in recipient real consumption. The allocation effect increases the recipient’s
imports from the donor and thus the donor’s exports, as does the aggregate
effect. But this increase in exports leads to an increase in the donor’s factory
gate prices and real consumption. The question of whether the increase in the
recipient’s imports from the donor constitutes a real consumption gain for the
donor depends on which effect prevails. For the recipients, on the one hand,
the allocation effect implies that their factory gate prices increase less than
they would otherwise in response to an impartial transfer. On the other hand,
recipients benefit from lower trade costs.
4. Estimation strategy
In section 3.2, there are two parameters of interest that affect recipients’
imports, γ and δijt, with different effects on welfare. We employ a two-stage
estimation procedure to identify these parameters. The first step consists of
estimating a version of equation (8), the net imports equation. This equation
identifies γ, which measures the effect of aggregate aid on aggregate domestic
absorption or the “absorption ratio” (Hansen and Headey 2010). The second
step consists of estimating a standard bilateral gravity model of trade to
identify δijt. As mentioned above, the income effect of aid and the effect on
net imports are the same irrespective of the size of δijt according to equation
(11). Instead, δijt affects only the allocation of spending after the aid inflow.
In order to estimate δijt in a theory-consistent way, we specify a standard
gravity model conditioned on total exports and imports.
In the first stage, the net import equation, there are other reasons, unre-
lated to development aid, why expenditure may differ from market income.
Following Yotov et al. (2016), we specify these residual differences as pro-
portional to market income by a factor θjt > 0. For θjt > 1 country j spends
more than its income and for θjt < 1 country j spends less than its income.
We write Ejt = θjtyjt + γTFjt. Furthermore, we use GDP as a scaling factor.






+(θjt −1) , with θjt −1=ηj +ϑt +ujt. (12)
Equation (12) explains net imports as a function of total aid receipts.
Empirically, (θjt − 1) is an error term that consists of an individual (ηj)
and a time (ϑt) fixed effect component and an idiosyncratic component ujt.
Moreover, we use three-year averages in order to reduce the influence of
business cycle variation, in accordance with Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017).
As mentioned above, equation (12) is a reduced form equation. All indirect
effects of a higher ratio of aid to GDP are ascribed to TFjt/yjt and would not
imply a bias. Endogeneity becomes a concern, however, if exogenous changes
in the rate of external saving or other components of the balance of payments
affect net imports, which in turn trigger aid inflows or outflows. This line of
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argument is plausible mainly in episodes of current account crises and would
typically exert a downward bias. A decrease in net capital imports, leading to
a corresponding decline in net merchandise imports, could trigger a financial
crisis. This would mean that a collapse in net imports would lead to an increase
in foreign assistance and would imply a negative relationship between aid and
net imports. If this is the case, the OLS estimation will produce a downward
bias in the coefficient of aid. In many cases of current account crises, the
IMF in coordination with some donor countries provided concessional loans
to smooth the decline in other inflows. We exploit this role the IMF plays
and control for the ratio of IMF aid to GDP in order to address this type of
endogeneity. We also perform a robustness check using a similar instrumental
variable (IV) approach as Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017). The estimates
γ̂ provide the basis for our bilateral and general equilibrium analysis that
extends the scope of Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017).
Thus equipped with an estimate for γ, we proceed to the second stage.
Following the notation of Larch et al. (2019), we rewrite equation (11) as
xijt =exp
(











where λit are exporter–year and ψjt are importer–year fixed effects, μij are
country-pair fixed effects controlling for time-invariant trade cost determi-
nants (Baier and Bergstrand 2007) and φij are country pair-specific trends,
zijt is a vector of control variables and εijt is a random error term.
Before proceeding with the estimation, we have to deal with the fact that
our parameter of interest δijt still has a non-linear effect after log-linearization.
We circumvent this problem by approximating ln(1 + δijttfÅijt/(yjt + γ̂TFjt))
by using δijt ln(1+ tfÅijt/(yjt + γ̂TFjt)) as in Hansen and Rand (2014) in order
to get an estimate for δijt. This approximation performs well compared to
standard linear approximations.5 We will refer to the term (1 + tfÅijt/(yjt +
γ̂TFjt)) as the bilateral expansion factor. We construct this factor using the
estimate γ̂ obtained from estimating equation (12). In addition, we will test
the sensitivity of our results with respect to the size of γ̂. Finally, in order
to identify δijt, we have to impose some restrictions. We start by imposing
5 One alternative approach to linearization would be to use first-order Taylor
series expansions. Comparing our approximation with first-order Taylor series
expansions around zero and one it turns out that for plausible values of δijt our
approximation always performs slightly better than one of them and slightly
worse than the other. Given that there is no a priori reason to prefer one centre
of the expansion to the other, our approximation is a reasonable alternative. It
has the additional advantage of consistency with the recent literature (Hansen
and Rand 2014, Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2017, for example).
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δijt = δ∀i, j, t. Later on in the analysis, we will relax this assumption and
examine whether δijt varies with trade costs, as suggested in section 3.2. After
applying these changes our baseline specification is
xijt =exp
(











The control variables include a dummy for regional trade agreements (RTAs)
between i and j, a dummy for both countries being WTO members and a cur-
rency union dummy. One concern in the estimation of equation (14) is that
higher import shares could trigger more bilateral aid inflows (Osei et al. 2004,
Younas 2008). We argue that this association is likely driven by the predicted
part of trade and not by temporary shocks. Donors are unlikely to change their
development cooperation in response to short-run fluctuations in their import
share unless they are perceived to mark a permanent shift. For this reason, we
include bilateral fixed effects μij , following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), and
bilateral trends φij that capture long-term and predicted changes of bilateral
trade flows, following Baier et al. (2014). For instance, the fixed effects control
for time-invariant confounding factors and the bilateral trends control for the
possibility that unobserved trade costs are constantly decreasing (or increasing)
over time within a country pair.6
We estimate equation (14) using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator as advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). In
particular, we employ the iterative process proposed in Larch et al. (2019) to
enable the inclusion of high-dimensional fixed effects.7 One crucial advantage
of the PPML estimator, as shown by Fally (2015), is that it produces theory-
consistent estimates for the multilateral resistance terms if importer–year
and exporter–year fixed effects are included. The reason is that in PPML
introducing fixed effects is tantamount to conditioning on the total exports
and imports. This property also guarantees consistency in the estimation of
equation (12) and (14). Since net imports are kept constant in equation (14),
we can be certain that net absorption effects and allocation effects will not
be conflated. Another advantage of the PPML estimator is that it allows for
zero trade flows (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011).8
6 According to Larch et al. (2019) the fixed effects and bilateral trends are partialled
out using auxiliary regression of the regressors on the fixed effects.
7 We use their user-written Stata command ppml_panel_sg.
8 The traditional gravity framework does not predict any zero trade flows. For in-
stance Helpman et al. (2008), in a framework including heterogeneous firms, show
that zero trade flows are linked to fixed costs and may well be derived from a dif-
ferent data-generating process. For this reason, we will conduct a sensitivity anal-
ysis regarding the inclusion of zero trade flows in the estimation of equation (14).
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4.1. Comparative statics
In accordance with the gravity literature (Yotov et al. 2016), the estimation
procedure outlined above identifies key parameters of the structural gravity
model by imposing specific non-linear constraints. These constraints comprise
the multilateral resistance terms and the market clearing condition. While
they allow unbiased parameter estimation, the results can only be interpreted
as partial equilibrium effects. The secondary effects of a transfer and effects on
third countries, however, are general equilibrium effects that operate through
changes in these constraints. In order to gauge the magnitude and direction
of these effects, we therefore perform counterfactual analysis in the spirit of
Dekle et al. (2007). This analysis also allows us to compute the implications of
aid transfers for the real consumption of every country given our parameter
estimates.
We define two counterfactual scenarios. First, in scenario 1, we consider
a complete abolition of all foreign assistance. Second, under scenario 2, we
consider the case where all bilateral aid flows in the world are set to zero,
except those that include the country in question either as a donor or as a
recipient.9 Thus, in our first counterfactual scenario the recipient suffers from
a direct reduction of its own income, due to the primary income effect and the
subsequent adjustment of its prices due to a terms of trade effect. Additionally,
the bilateral effect reduces trade costs vis-à-vis the donor, which also affects
prices, and the transfers between other country pairs affect the recipient’s
market clearing condition. The purpose of scenario 2 is to determine the
importance of transfers between other country pairs in the overall effect. All
flows that are abolished under scenario 2 are also abolished under scenario 1,
but in scenario 2, the recipient in question keeps foreign aid, and is only
affected by the abolition of the transfers between other country pairs; that
is, a shift in demand between foreign markets. This way, we identify the
extent to which third countries benefit or lose from transfers. We can assess
the importance of such third-country effects by comparing the figures from
scenario 2 to scenario 1.
In both scenarios, we hold the quantity of production fixed such that yit =
pitq̄it. Following Dekle et al. (2007) and Baier et al. (2019), we base our
counterfactual analysis on the market clearing condition, holding world GDP
constant. For any variable x, x′ denotes its counterfactual value and x̂=x′/x.










From there, using equation (2), one can derive the counterfactual equilib-
rium, which is characterized by two equations:
9 For the purposes of this simulation, we keep multilateral aid and aid from
unidentified sources unchanged.

































We compute the counterfactual values p̂it and P̂ jt using the same iterative
process as in Baier et al. (2019). First, we plug in tf ′ijt and TF ′jt and calculate
the counterfactual p̂it for all countries, first holding Pjt constant. Then, we
calculate the implied P̂ 1−σjt from equation (17). Again, this has repercussions
on the equilibrium value for p̂it and, thus, we iteratively calculate the values
of p̂it and P̂ jt until the process converges.







The models are estimated using data for a balanced panel of 132 countries
over the period from 1995 to 2012 (see the list of countries in table A1 in
the appendix).10 Bilateral imports of goods and total exports and imports of
goods and services are taken from UNCTAD. Data on income variables and
population are taken from the World Bank (World Development Indicators
Database 2015).11 The dummies for RTAs in force and for currency unions
(CU) are from de Sousa (2012).12 WTO accession dates used to construct the
WTO membership dummy are taken from the WTO website.13 Data on aid
flows are obtained from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. We
use total aid received (including multilateral aid) for the net imports equation.
At the bilateral level, we focus on direct bilateral transfers in the gravity
10 We exclude all territories that are not countries, and countries that are missing
trade data for one year or GDP data. Moreover, we drop countries with a
population under 1.5 million and countries that export more than they produce
at any point in our sample period.
11 We employ the user-written command wbopendata by Azevedo (2011).
12 We updated it to include RTAs notified to the WTO after the publication of de
Sousa’s (2012) data using the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Information
System (RTA-IT).
13 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
Transfers in the gravity equation 15
equation. Missing values are treated as zeroes. Table A2 in the appendix
reports summary statistics. For the comparative statics exercise, we use a
proxy for internal trade. Following Yotov (2012), we construct internal trade
flows as the difference between GDP and total exports.14
5.2. Main results
Table 1 presents the main results for the first stage (equation (12)) and
provides estimates for our first parameter of interest γ. We report results for
different dependent variables: In columns (1) and (2), we use net imports
of goods; in columns (3) and (4), we use net imports of services; and in
columns (5) and (6), we use the combined net imports of goods and services.
In columns (1), (3) and (5), there are no other control variables apart from
the fixed effects. In columns (2), (4) and (6), we add the ratio of assistance
from the IMF in relation to recipient GDP to mitigate reverse causality.
We find a positive and statistically significant effect of development aid
on net imports of goods (columns (1) and (2)). For net imports of services
(columns (3) and (4)) the coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
As expected, results in columns (5) and (6) indicate that the effect of devel-
opment aid on net imports of goods and services is positive and significant
and comparable in magnitude to the effect on net imports of goods. Note that
under the assumptions of the model, γ can be interpreted as the effect of a 1
USD increase in development aid received on net imports measured in USD.
According to column (1), a 1 USD inflow of development aid increases net
imports by 0.28 USD. When controlling for aid received from the IMF, the
point estimate increases to 0.357 USD (column (2)). Aid received from the
IMF is statistically significant and as expected bears a negative sign when
using net imports of goods as the dependent variable. Aid received from the
IMF does not exert a statistically significant effect on net imports of services.
These results imply that 36% of aid received is spent on goods in the recipient
country. This figure is notably lower that reported by Temple and Van de Sijpe
(2017), who find effects of between 54% and 100%. The disparity is found to
be mainly due to the time period covered. Estimating the equation for different
time periods, we find that the coefficient is in the range of the results reported by
Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) if we consider the period 1970 to 1995.15
Table 2 reports results for the second-stage estimation and provides
estimates of our second parameter of interest δijt. For the construction of
14 As Yotov et al. (2016) emphasize, there is an inherent problem in this
procedure. GDP is a measure of added value whereas export values include the
cost of imported inputs. As a consequence, some internal trade values
constructed in this way may be negative. Unfortunately, as reported by Baier
et al. (2019), the alternative of using sectoral production data does not solve
this issue either.
15 Results are available from the authors on request.
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TABLE 1
First stage baseline results
Dependent variable: Net importsjt/GDPjt (three-year average)
Goods Services Goods & services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
γ 0.283* 0.357** 0.0527 0.0408 0.313* 0.361*
(2.29) (2.99) (0.92) (0.65) (2.28) (2.56)
γIMF −0.994+ 0.139 −0.558
(−1.98) (0.47) (−1.06)
N 792 792 765 765 765 765
NOTES: t-statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001. Estimation of equation (12). All regressions include year
fixed effects and country fixed effects. γ is the coefficient on total net
aid receipts divided by recipient GDP. γIMF is the coefficient on aid
received from the IMF divided by recipient GDP.
the bilateral aid expansion factor, we use a value of γ =0.357 from column (2)
of table 1. All estimations are performed using the PPML estimator and
include importer–year and exporter–year fixed effects. We report t-statistics
based on country-pair clustered standard errors in parentheses and t-statistics
based on multiway clustered standard errors in brackets. We should find a
significant effect of the bilateral expansion factor at the bilateral level if aid
affects not only the total expenditure of the recipient country but also changes
the allocation of this spending in favour of the donor.
In our baseline specification in column (1), we include bilateral trends and
country-pair fixed effects in order to control for the possibility that donors
may reward their trading partners with aid. The coefficient δ is statistically
non-significant at all conventional levels, irrespective of whether country-pair
clustered or multiway-clustered standard errors are used.16 In columns (2)
and (3), we use less conservative estimations. First, in column (2), we remove
bilateral trends. On the one hand, bilateral trends may capture potential en-
dogeneity. On the other hand, they may swallow the effects of development aid
if trade responds mainly to long-run changes. However, the effect remains non-
significant at conventional levels. When removing country-pair fixed effects in
column (3), we find a statistically significant effect when using country-pair
clustered standard errors. Using multiway clustered standard errors, the effect
is still statistically non-significant.
As for control variables, RTA has a positive effect, which is significant at
the 5% level when using country-pair clustered standard errors and at the
16 The value for γ used to construct the bilateral expansion factor has little effect
on the results of any variable. Table A3 in the appendix reports results using
different values of γ. The effect remains non-significant and is quantitatively
similar.
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TABLE 2
Second stage baseline results
Dependent variable: Bilateral importsijt (annual)





constructed using γ = 0.357
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base No trend No pair FEs Interactions
δ 0.879 0.537 14.02 3.162
(0.71) (0.26) (7.78)*** (1.93)+










RT Aijt 0.0375 0.0603 0.637 0.0383
(2.01)* (2.54)* (27.67)*** (2.04)*
[1.67]+ [2.27]* [5.57]*** [1.67]+
CUijt −0.0112 −0.0299 −0.0213 −0.0111
(−0.42) (−0.98) (−0.81) (−0.41)
[−0.31] [−0.74] [−0.12] [−0.31]
W T Oijt −0.0791 0.0526 0.316 −0.0780
(−1.29) (0.73) (6.35)*** (−1.27)
[−1.27] [0.47] [1.24] [−1.25]
δ + δComm.Lang.ij 1.470
(0.66)
[0.57]
δ + δColonyij 1.139
(0.43)
[0.43]
δ + δRT Aijt 0.433
(0.17)
[0.17]
N 30,1937 30,1950 30,1950 30,1937
Pair FEs Yes Yes – Yes
Bilateral trends Yes – – Yes
Time-invariant controls – – Yes –
NOTES: t-statistics based on country-pair (multi-way) clustered standard
errors in parentheses (brackets). +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Estimation of equation (14). All regressions include importer–year and exporter–
year fixed effects and were estimated using PPML using the Stata command
ppml_panel_sg by Larch et al. (2019). Time invariant controls include the log
of distance, a common colony dummy and a common ethnic language dummy.
The same variables have been interacted with the bilateral expansion factor to
obtain δComm.Lang.ij , δColonyij and δRT Aijt .
10% level when using multiway clustered standard errors. We do not find a
statistically significant effect on bilateral trade of either WTO membership, in
line with Rose (2004), or of a currency union, in line with Larch et al. (2019).
In section 3.2, we showed that according to theory the size of δijt depends
on the difference in trade costs within an aid project managed by the donor
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and other demand from the recipient. Since transport can reasonably be
expected to be the same, the difference should be largely due to differences
in organizational and search costs. If the trading partners share a common
language, have historical colonial ties or have formed an RTA, these costs are
likely already low and we should expect a lower effect of aid. In order to see
if this is driving our results, we interact the bilateral aid expansion factor
with dummies for a common language, past colonial relationship (both from
CEPII) and for an RTA. In fact, as reported in column (4), we now find a
positive and significant effect of bilateral aid on trade of a magnitude of 3.161.
This effect, however, becomes non-significant when a common language, a past
colonial relationship or an RTA is present (see the lower panel of table 2). In
assessing the size of the effect and in our general equilibrium analysis, we will
thus use δ̂ijt =3.161(1−Comm.Lang.ij)(1−Colonyij)(1−RTAijt).
There are different ways of assessing the economic size of our estimates
from tables 1 and 2. While the bilateral effect is merely an allocation effect and
does not exert an independent influence on overall net imports, it can affect
bilateral elasticities. From equation (11), it follows that the elasticity of trade
with respect to bilateral aid consists of a budget effect on total imports and
a relative project effect. The elasticity is not constant and depends positively












(+ general equilibrium effects).
(20)
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the share of bilateral aid from
any given donor in the recipient’s overall budget in row (1) and estimates
of elasticities of bilateral trade with respect to bilateral aid in row (2). To
gauge the importance of bilateral effects on bilateral elasticities, we calculate
the ratio of elasticities under different assumptions. We compare bilateral
elasticities calculated based on our estimates to bilateral elasticities calculated
assuming no bilateral allocation effect (δijt = 0). Finally, we calculate the
absolute effects in monetary terms that our estimates imply. We use γ̂ =
0.357 as in column (2) of table 1 and δ̂ijt = 3.161(1 − Comm.Lang.ij)(1 −
Colonyij)(1−RTAijt) as in column (4) of table 2.
17 Note that this specification also implies that the elasticity of trade with respect
to GDP is not constant. Instead, we have for T Fjt > 0 that the elasticity of





(+ general equilibrium effects). (19)
The reason for this is simply that the elasticity with respect to the overall
budget is equal to one in (3) and (11). Since the importance of GDP and aid in
the budget depends on how large the other part is, the elasticity of trade with
respect to each part of the budget cannot be constant.
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TABLE 3
Size of the effects
Estimates used: γ = 0.357 δB = 3.161(1 − Comm.Lang.)(1 − Colony)(1 − RT A)






41,938 0.001275 0.00442 0.000 0.00006 0.151599
(2) d ln xijt








41,938 7.675012 3.78624 1 9.846656 9.854342
(4) dxijt
dtfijt
41,938 0.01257 0.029966 0.000 0.003415 0.873757
NOTES: This table reports summary statistics for the share of bilateral aid from any
given donor in the overall recipient budget (row (1)), elasticities of trade with respect
to aid (row (2)), the elasticity of trade with respect to aid given that δ = 0.84 divided
by the elasticity of trade with respect to aid given that δ = 0 (row (3)) and the effect
of bilateral aid on bilateral trade in monetary terms (row (4)). Elasticities are partial
equilibrium effects calculated according to (20) excluding general equilibrium effects.
Our calculations suggest that bilateral aid from a single donor accounts for
up to 15% of the recipient country’s budget according to row (1) of table 3.
Elasticities for donor country imports summarized in row (2) range from just
above zero to 0.36 in some cases. The bilateral effects contribute substantially
to the magnitude of these elasticities. According to row (3) of table 3, these
bilateral elasticities are higher by a factor of 7.67 compared to elasticities the
model would imply under δ = 0 in the absence of bilateral allocation effects.
Nonetheless, row (4) indicates that most donors increase their bilateral exports
by less than their bilateral donation. The direct bilateral effects of 0.003 USD
for the median and 0.01 USD on average seem low if compared to results from
table 1, according to which 1 USD of aid increases the recipient’s aggregate net
imports by 0.357 USD. This suggests that the bilateral allocation effect of de-
velopment aid is not strong enough to overcompensate the negative income ef-
fect for the donor. Our comparative statics exercise in section 5.4 confirm this.
5.3. Robustness checks
Table 4 reports robustness checks for the first-stage estimation of our para-
meter γ. First, the effect of aid on net imports may be different for recipients
and donors. In order to check whether that affects our results, in columns (1)
and (2), we keep only net recipients of development aid. For net imports of
goods the point estimate increases by around 0.05 and becomes statistically
significant at the 0.1% level, whereas for services it remains non-significant.
Next, in columns (3) and (4), we allow for country-specific trends to control
for the possibility that long-term increasing trends in net imports, financed
through means other than aid, may crowd out foreign aid.18 The coefficient
18 This is implemented by combining first-differencing with fixed effects as in the
random growth first differences (RGFD) model described in Wooldridge (2010,
20 H. W. Kruse and I. Martínez-Zarzoso
TABLE 4
Robustness checks first stage
Dependent variable: Net importsjt/GDPjt (three-year average) of goods or services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Recipients only Country trends Mixed model Control function
Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services
γ 0.402*** 0.0495 0.238** 0.0378 0.357** 0.0408 1.057 0.0158
(3.57) (0.80) (2.71) (0.68) (3.00) (0.66) (1.41) (0.06)
γIMF −1.071* 0.134 −0.407 −0.264 −0.994* 0.139
(−2.15) (0.45) (−1.33) (−1.10) (−1.99) (0.47)
ê1 −0.865 0.0425
(−1.06) (0.15)
N 636 609 660 633 792 765 792 765
1st stage F 17.05 17.73
Under ID 0.0113 0.0097
NOTES: Estimation of equation (12). t-statistics in parentheses. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<
0.01, ***p < 0.001. All regressions include year fixed effects and country fixed effects. γ is
the coefficient on total net aid receipts divided by recipient GDP. γIMF is the coefficient
on aid received from the IMF divided by recipient GDP. Country trends were implemented
using the RGFD method (Wooldridge 2010, pp. 375–377). 1st stage F reports the first stage
F-statistic on the excluded instrument for the control function approach. Under ID reports
the p-value of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank test.
for goods becomes smaller, around 0.28, but remains significant. In equation
(12) the effect of aid on net imports is assumed to be constant. We relax
that assumption in columns (5) and (6) and estimate a random coefficient




. The results remain similar and we obtain
an estimate for the variance σ̂2γ that is indistinguishable from zero. All in
all, point estimates for γ seem reasonably stable. Aid received from the IMF
is statistically significant in columns (1) and (5). For goods, it always bears
the expected negative coefficient. As before, we do not find a statistically
significant effect of aid on net imports of services.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we use a control function approach to
address remaining endogeneity concerns. We follow and Van de Sijpe (2017)
in constructing a synthetic measure of aid using historical bilateral aid shares
between 1960 and 1969 and current aid budgets. The point estimate for net
imports of goods increases to 1.057. However, it becomes statistically non-
significant. Moreover, according to Wooldridge (2015), the control function
approach provides a heteroskedasticity-robust version of the Hausman test of
exogeneity. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the first-stage residual
has no effect on net imports. By the same token, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that TFjt/yjt is exogenous.
pp. 375–377). However, aid disbursements may follow a trend because many
projects involve long-term planning in their implementation. Removing the
trend may emphasize the role of short-run deviations from that trend and thus
shift the focus to very specific types of aid. Interesting conclusions may still be
derived from detrended models.
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Table 5 reports robustness checks for the second stage. In order to see
whether including zeroes affects significance, we drop those observations in
column (1). This increases point estimates and has minor effects on t-statistics.
The effect of aid on trade remains significant unless countries share a common
language, a past colonial relationship or are members of the same RTA. As a
next step, we control for the bilateral reporting gap in column (2) (Kellenberg
and Levinson 2019). Bilateral aid may lead to a better alignment of statistical
practices and hence reduce the differences in reported trade values which
could bias our results. Introducing bilateral reporting gaps does not affect
our results. Neither does introducing a non-aid dummy as in the previous
literature (e.g., Wagner 2003) in column (3). Another problem could be that
trade between donors adds too much noise. In order to see how development
aid affects imports, it may be preferable to include only importers that are a
net recipient on average, as shown in column (6). Again, the effect of aid is
only significantly positive in the absence of a common language, a past colonial
relationship or an RTA. The point estimate is higher than in column (4) of
table 2. Moreover, the interaction between RTA and the bilateral expansion
factor is now statistically significant when using simple clustered standard
errors. This does not, however, affect any of our conclusions.
5.4. Comparative statics
In this section, we simulate two counterfactual scenarios including secondary
effects of aid based on our estimates and the structural gravity model as
outlined above. Throughout, for the elasticity of substitution, we will as-
sume σ = 5 based on the estimation by Fontagné et al. (2018), γ̂ = 0.357 as
in column (2) of table 1 and δ̂ijt = 3.161(1 − Comm.Lang.ij)(1 − Colonyij)
(1 − RTAijt) as in column (4) of table 2. Our first and main counterfactual
scenario is a world in which all aid flows are set to zero (tf ′ijt = 0 ∀i, j, t). In
the second scenario, we investigate the importance of third-country effects for
any country l. We do this by running separate simulations for each country
l where all bilateral aid flows that do not include l either as a recipient or
donor are set to zero, that is, tf ′ijt = 0 if i = l and j = l. These flows are also
abolished under scenario 1 and scenario 2 merely disentangles the role that
third-country effects play in the counterfactual abolition of aid.19
The main results for the first scenario, a complete abolition of aid relative
to the actual situation, are shown in figure 1. Table A4 in the appendix
provides the exact figures for simulated changes in factory gate prices, real
consumption and aggregate exports averaged across the sample period for
all countries in our sample for both scenarios. Figure 1a depicts the implied
percentage changes in aggregate exports. As mentioned above (see section 3.2),
19 Note that for the purposes of these third-country simulations, we keep
multilateral aid and aid from unidentified sources unchanged, since we want to
rule out any direct income effects of aid on the recipient in question.
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TABLE 5
Robustness checks second stage
Dependent variable: Bilateral importsijt (annual)





constructed using γ = 0.357
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No zeroes Rep. gap Aid dummy Only recipients
δ 3.340 3.019 3.041 4.566
(2.18)* (2.03)* (1.85)+ (2.75)**
[1.89]+ [1.76]+ [2.14]* [2.30]*
δComm.Lang.ij −1.556 −1.906 −1.636 −2.238
(−0.76) (−0.96) (−0.67) (−0.98)
[−0.66] [−0.71] [−0.54] [−0.87]
δColonyij −2.036 −1.799 −1.959 −2.116
(−0.93) (−0.98) (−0.77) (−0.89)
[−0.93] [−0.99] [−0.70] [−0.81]
δRT Aijt −2.371 −1.488 −2.734 −3.964
(−1.21) (−0.88) (−1.26) (−1.98)*
[−0.95] [−0.85] [−1.09] [−1.40]
1{tfijt > 0} 0.00975
(1.06)
[0.72]
RT Aijt 0.041 0.0311 0.0381 0.0739
(2.19)* (1.73)+ (2.04)* (4.13)***
[1.78]+ [1.30] [1.68]+ [2.75]**
CUijt −0.026 −0.0405 −0.0110 −0.108
(−1.02) (−1.80)+ (−0.41) (−2.23)*
[−0.76] [−1.21] [−0.30] [−3.22]**
W T Oijt −0.077 −0.136 −0.0773 −0.0215
(−1.26) (−1.69)+ (−1.26) (−0.53)
[−1.24] [−1.57] [−1.24] [−0.37]
Bil. rep. gap 0.903
(19.49)***
[13.95]***
N 251,377 293,598 301,937 240,650
NOTES: See table 1. “Bil. rep. gap” = bilateral reporting gaps defined in
accordance with Kellenberg and Levinson (2019).
primary, secondary and allocation effects of a transfer are associated with an
increase in the exports of the donor. Consequently, an abolition of all aid flows
leads to a reduction in donors’ exports and an increase in recipients’ exports.
The only exceptions are Croatia, Kenya, Panama, South Africa, Thailand and
Turkmenistan, where the abolition of aid in third countries drives a decline
in exports.20
20 This can be seen by comparing the changes in exports under scenarios 1 and 2
in table A4. The last two columns of table A4 report the ratio of the changes
under scenarios 1 and 2 for exports and real consumption. The ratio is above
100% for all six countries, except for Thailand (73%). This indicates that third
country effects are largely responsible.
















(b)  Changes in real consumption (in %)
FIGURE 1 General equilibrium effects: All aid abolished
NOTE: These figures depicts the average change in aggregate exports and real
consumption in % under scenario 2.
The increase in exports goes hand in hand with a decline in real con-
sumption for recipients. The four countries that lose the most in terms of
real consumption (Burundi −8.79%, Mozambique −7.16%, Rwanda −6.87%
and Sierra Leone −6.99%) are also among the top 11 countries in terms
of relative increases in exports (Burundi +30.87%, Mozambique +8.44%,
Rwanda +26.69% and Sierra Leone +14.17%). Moreover, in all but one case
non-European recipient countries that see their exports increase receive a
lower price for their exports.
In the first scenario, the effects we obtain are total effects comprising
primary and secondary effects of the transfer, bilateral allocation effects and
third-country effects, as discussed above. In order to assess the role of the sec-
ondary and bilateral allocation effects on real consumption, we first construct
a variable that captures primary effects. Without price effects, P = P ′, we
have Δwj/wj =−γTFj/Ej . Since we used γ =0.357 from table 1 to construct
our counterfactual scenario, the primary effect of a complete abolition of aid
would be Δwj/wj = −0.357 × TFj/Ej . As already explained, in our model
the secondary effects reinforce the primary effect, while bilateral allocation
effects may reduce the burden of the donor. To evaluate which effect prevails,
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TABLE 6
Third-country effects
Variable: Share of beneficiaries from third-country effects
Net importer Net exporter
From/to donors Total
Net importer from recipients 0.35 0.87 0.56
Net exporter to recipients 0.15 0.46 0.36
Total 0.31 0.70
NOTES: This table shows the share of countries that experience
an increase in real consumption in our simulation of scenario 2. See
table A4 for country-specific changes in real consumption.
we first regress the counterfactual real consumption effects from our first
scenario against the average ratio of aid to expenditure TFj/Ej . If there are
no secondary effects, the coefficient should equal (−γ̂) = −0.357. A smaller
coefficient would suggest that secondary effects are on average stronger than
bilateral allocation effects. Conversely, a coefficient larger than −0.357 would
suggest that the bilateral allocation effects outweigh the secondary effects on







+ êj , with R2 =0.998. (21)
According to the results in expression (21), aid received explains more than
99% of the variation in the welfare effects. However, the absolute value of the
point estimate is 6% larger than −0.357 and statistically different, indicating
that on average the bilateral allocation effects are not strong enough to offset
the secondary effects for donors. This implies that despite the bilateral alloca-
tion effect, on average donors’ terms of trade improve following an abolition
of aid. For recipients, who benefit from secondary effects of the transfer, the
corresponding coefficient is −0.4009—that is, 12% larger in absolute terms
than −0.357. As a result, they are also hit harder by an abolition of aid than
the pure income effect would suggest.
To assess the role of third-country effects, we turn to scenario 2. Results
for the simulation are reported in table A4 in the appendix. In addition
to counterfactual changes in exports, prices and real consumption, table A4
reports in its last two columns the relative importance of third-country effects
compared to scenario 1 for exports and real consumption—that is, it reports
the ratio of counterfactual effects in scenario 2 to counterfactual effects in
scenario 1. Since the only difference between scenarios 1 and 2 is that there is
no primary income effect in the latter, this comparison allows us to evaluate
the extent to which third-country effects drive the counterfactual changes in
the former. As mentioned above, in some cases third-country effects can have
a substantial effect on exports under scenario 1.
In terms of real consumption, third-country effects play a smaller role on
average. One key determining factor of whether countries will benefit from
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third-country effects is whether they are net exporters to donors or recipients.
Net exporters to recipients stand to lose because the destination markets
shrink. This loss can be compensated if they are also net exporters to donors,
where the markets expand. On the other hand, net importers from recipients
can benefit from lower prices, whereas net importers from donors will have to
pay higher prices. Table 6 shows the share of beneficiaries from third-country
effects, distinguishing between net exporters and net importers to donors and
recipient, respectively. If all third-country aid flows are abolished, 70% of net
exporters to donors gain, whereas only 56% of net importers from recipients
do. Out of the countries that are net exporters with respect to donors and net
importers with respect to recipients, 87% stand to benefit from third-country
effects.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new two-stage procedure to disentangle the effects
of development aid on trade flows. We augment the gravity model by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) by first including foreign development aid as a
transfer of disposable income and then allowing for bilateral effects in the
gravity model. The model comprises three types of effects: a primary income
effect, a secondary terms of trade effect due to the geographical relocation
of demand, and a bilateral trade cost effect that counteracts the secondary
effect.
We propose a way to discern overall budget effects of a transfer and
bilateral effects that change the import shares. The theory suggests that
the budget effect is the effect of overall aid on net imports, whereas the
bilateral trade cost effect is the effect of bilateral aid on bilateral imports. We
implement this two-stage procedure using a fixed effects estimator explaining
net imports in the first stage. In the second stage, a gravity model is estimated
using a PPML estimator with high-dimensional fixed effects.
The empirical results obtained in the first stage suggest that 1 USD of
aggregate foreign development aid increases net imports on average by around
0.36 USD. This effect is statistically significant and robust to changes in
the specification. At the bilateral level, our results suggest that trade cost
effects only play a role for country pairs that do not have historical (colonial
past), cultural (common language) or political (RTA) relationships. This could
suggest that aid reduces organizational costs.
Finally, we compute comparative statics for two counterfactual scenarios
in order to assess real consumption gains and losses due to transfers. First, we
simulated the complete abolition of aid. In the second scenario, we abolish aid
for all countries except the given bilateral link. According to our simulation
of the first scenario, donors benefit not only from a higher income, but also
from an improvement of their terms of trade. This implies that despite the
bilateral effects of a transfer in favour of the donor, the secondary terms
of trade effect of a transfer is negative. Results from the second scenario
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show that third-country effects play a smaller role for real consumption. Net
importers from recipient countries and net exporters to donors stand to gain
if all other countries’ aid is abolished.
One limitation of our simulation is that we do not consider dynamic effects
and the effects aid may have on the distribution of power and institutions
within the recipient country (Bräutigam and Knack 2004). Adding effects on
capital accumulation and infrastructure (Calì and te Velde 2011) could be
a fruitful avenue for future research. Since the proposed theoretical model is
stated in general terms, it is in principle applicable for other types of transfers.
We leave for further research the application of the model to international
remittances.
Appendix: Additional tables and figures
TABLE A1
List of countries
Albania Denmark Lebanon Rwanda
Algeria Dominican Rep. Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Angola Ecuador Libya Senegal
Argentina Egypt Lithuania Serbia
Armenia El Salvador Madagascar Sierra Leone
Australia Ethiopia Malawi Slovakia
Austria Finland Mali Slovenia
Azerbaijan France Mauritania South Africa
Bangladesh Georgia Mexico Spain
Belarus Germany Moldova Sri Lanka
Belgium Ghana Mongolia Sudan
Benin Greece Morocco Sweden
Bolivia Guatemala Mozambique Switzerland
Bosnia–Herzegovina Guinea Namibia Taiwan
Botswana Haiti Nepal Tajikistan
Brazil Honduras Netherlands Tanzania
Bulgaria Hungary New Zealand Thailand
Burkina Faso India Nicaragua Togo
Burundi Indonesia Niger Tunisia
Cambodia Iran Nigeria Turkey
Cameroon Ireland North Macedonia Turkmenistan
Canada Israel Norway USA
Central African Rep. Italy Oman Uganda
Chad Jamaica Pakistan Ukraine
Chile Japan Panama UAE
China Jordan Papua New Guinea UK
Colombia Kazakhstan Paraguay Uruguay
Congo, DR. Kenya Peru Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Philippines Venezuela
Côte d’Ivoire Kuwait Poland Vietnam
Croatia Kyrgyzstan Portugal Yemen
Cuba Laos Romania Zambia
Czech Rep. Latvia Russia Zimbabwe
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TABLE A2
Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Median
xij 301,950 522.883 4,940.307 0 444,386 1.926
GDPjt 301,950 354,354.5 1,266,816 635.874 16,155,255 32,273.01
Aidjt 301950 −272.82 2,730.964 −30,919.77 11,428.02 208.52
AidBILijt 301,950 2.314 25.898 0 3,185.74 0
Aidjt
GDPjt
301,950 0.038 0.063 −0.014 0.606 0.007
Bil.Aidijt
GDPjt
301,950 0 0.002 0 0.18 0
RT Aijt 301,950 0.107 0.309 0 1 0
NOTES: Values for import flows (xij), GDPit and GDPjt, total aid received (Aidjt)
and bilateral aid (AidBILijt ) are reported in million USD. Based on the sample from
table 2. The period considered is 1995–2012. Note that for bilateral aid missings were
considered as zeroes.
TABLE A3
Sensitivity analysis second stage
Dependent variable: Bilateral importsijt (annual)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Assumption Estimates γ̂ from table 1
γ = 1 γ = 0.8 γ = 0.6 γ = 0.1 γ̂ = 0.283 γ̂ = 0.357
δ 0.922 0.912 0.899 0.850 0.871 0.879
(0.65) (0.67) (0.68) (0.73) (0.72) (0.71)
[0.96] [0.98] [1.01] [1.08] [1.05] [1.04]
RT Aijt 0.0375 0.0375 0.0375 0.0375 0.0375 0.0375
(2.01)* (2.01)* (2.01)* (2.01)* (2.01)* (2.01)*
[1.67]+ [1.67]+ [1.67]+ [1.67]+ [1.67]+ [1.67]+
W T Oijt −0.0791 −0.0791 −0.0791 −0.0791 −0.0791 −0.0791
(−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.29)
[−1.27] [−1.27] [−1.27] [−1.27] [−1.27] [−1.27]
CUijt −0.0112 −0.0112 −0.0112 −0.0112 −0.0112 −0.0112
(−0.42) (−0.42) (−0.42) (−0.42) (−0.42) (−0.42)
[−0.31] [−0.31] [−0.31] [−0.31] [−0.31] [−0.31]
N 30,1937 30,1937 30,1937 301937 30,1937 30,1937
NOTES: t-statistics based on country-pair clustered standard errors in
parentheses. t-statistics based on multiway clustered standard errors in brackets.
+p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Estimation of equation (14). All
regressions include importer–year and exporter–year and country-pair fixed effects
and country pair-specific trends. All regressions were estimated using PPML using
the Stata command ppml_panel_sg by Larch et al. (2019). δ is the coefficient on
the bilateral aid expansion factor ln (1 + tfijt/(yjt + γT Fjt)).
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TABLE A4
General equilibrium effects
Estimates used: γ = 0.357 δB = 3.161(1 − Comm.Lang.)(1 − Colony)(1 − RT A)
Scenario 1 (in %) Scenario 2 (in %) Comparison (in %)
tf0jkt = tfjkt∀k, j; tf0jkt = tfjkt∀k, j





















Albania 2.360 −0.614 −1.478 −0.067 −0.018 −0.001 −2.856 0.093
Algeria 0.210 −0.015 −0.116 0.024 0.008 0.002 11.302 −1.946
Angola 0.206 −0.060 −0.668 0.006 −0.006 0.007 2.807 −0.985
Argentina 0.023 −0.078 −0.021 −0.074 −0.026 −0.002 −320.749 10.061
Armenia 2.888 −0.774 −1.763 −0.056 −0.027 −0.000 −1.933 0.025
Australia −0.245 0.034 0.113 −0.029 −0.005 −0.001 12.029 −1.046
Austria −0.033 0.049 0.113 0.010 0.010 0.000 −30.317 0.074
Azerbaijan 0.391 −0.103 −0.487 −0.004 −0.009 0.001 −1.055 −0.213
Bangladesh 1.851 −0.408 −0.711 0.095 −0.005 0.005 5.145 −0.679
Belarus 0.016 −0.049 −0.099 −0.039 −0.021 −0.004 −245.424 3.976
Belgium 0.009 0.037 0.143 0.009 0.005 0.001 96.169 0.824
Benin 5.410 −2.057 −3.154 −0.961 −0.179 −0.020 −17.771 0.635
Bolivia 2.987 −0.777 −2.215 −0.021 −0.014 −0.000 −0.698 0.009
Bosnia– 1.796 −0.548 −2.043 −0.074 −0.033 −0.002 −4.122 0.107
Herzegovina
Botswana 0.872 −0.267 −0.468 0.097 −0.085 0.016 11.100 −3.416
Brazil 0.144 −0.065 −0.015 −0.025 −0.015 −0.000 −17.377 1.649
Bulgaria 0.098 −0.066 −0.199 −0.048 −0.018 −0.005 −48.482 2.277
Burkina Faso 13.500 −3.497 −4.508 −0.136 −0.180 0.010 −1.007 −0.218
Burundi 30.870 −6.940 −8.792 0.314 −0.353 0.048 1.016 −0.548
Cambodia 1.897 −0.435 −3.229 0.051 0.005 0.011 2.709 −0.331
Cameroon 3.010 −0.840 −1.612 −0.066 −0.051 0.000 −2.199 −0.004
Canada −0.046 0.044 0.115 0.024 0.015 0.001 −53.473 0.913
Central African 13.165 −3.083 −4.193 0.061 −0.056 0.007 0.464 −0.165
Rep.
Chad 3.301 −0.781 −2.350 0.153 −0.018 0.016 4.648 −0.689
Chile 0.090 −0.031 −0.036 −0.005 −0.007 0.000 −5.245 −0.862
China 0.085 −0.028 −0.025 0.002 −0.008 0.001 1.927 −3.965
Colombia 0.429 −0.113 −0.142 −0.007 −0.002 −0.000 −1.708 0.113
Congo, DR. 10.351 −2.775 −5.054 0.050 −0.208 0.027 0.483 −0.539
Costa Rica 0.016 −0.034 −0.069 −0.031 −0.014 −0.005 −194.616 7.580
Côte d’Ivoire 0.929 −0.775 −2.198 −0.438 −0.190 −0.037 −47.169 1.705
Croatia −0.180 −0.101 −0.108 −0.215 −0.037 −0.009 119.046 8.564
Cuba 0.387 −0.101 −0.075 −0.022 −0.002 −0.000 −5.575 0.308
Czech Rep. 0.092 0.026 −0.008 0.019 0.012 0.002 20.606 −28.728
Denmark −0.309 0.153 0.341 0.022 0.018 0.000 −7.015 0.126
Dominican Rep. 0.354 −0.060 −0.133 0.041 0.010 0.002 11.562 −1.173
Ecuador 0.253 −0.085 −0.181 −0.016 −0.012 −0.000 −6.187 0.139
Egypt 0.889 −0.306 −0.426 −0.129 −0.031 −0.003 −14.538 0.755
El Salvador 0.404 −0.246 −0.549 −0.146 −0.049 −0.008 −36.130 1.387
Ethiopia 12.550 −2.943 −4.084 −0.012 −0.032 0.002 −0.092 −0.043
Finland −0.081 0.069 0.164 0.012 0.009 0.000 −15.114 0.276
France −0.229 0.071 0.162 −0.004 0.002 −0.000 1.595 −0.184
Georgia 2.537 −0.731 −1.977 −0.101 −0.030 −0.003 −3.997 0.164
Germany −0.065 0.051 0.128 0.012 0.007 0.001 −18.354 0.456
Ghana 2.986 −0.901 −2.305 −0.135 −0.066 −0.003 −4.538 0.119
Greece −0.242 0.007 0.048 −0.090 −0.010 −0.001 37.089 −3.123
Guatemala 0.388 −0.216 −0.431 −0.142 −0.036 −0.008 −36.600 1.786
Guinea 3.349 −0.869 −2.437 0.010 −0.039 0.006 0.305 −0.239
Haiti 6.563 −1.548 −5.381 0.042 0.012 0.000 0.638 −0.005
(continued)
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TABLE A4
Continued
Estimates used: γ = 0.357 δB = 3.161(1 − Comm.Lang.)(1 − Colony)(1 − RT A)
Scenario 1 (in %) Scenario 2 (in %) Comparison (in %)
tf0jkt = tfjkt∀k, j; tf0jkt = tfjkt∀k, j





















Honduras 0.954 −0.254 −1.889 0.002 −0.012 0.004 0.255 −0.217
Hungary 0.071 0.018 −0.023 0.008 0.008 0.000 11.759 −1.240
India 0.075 −0.146 −0.088 −0.133 −0.045 −0.003 −176.333 3.482
Indonesia 0.204 −0.071 −0.155 −0.012 −0.010 −0.000 −5.781 0.027
Iran 0.066 −0.059 −0.026 −0.033 −0.018 −0.001 −49.819 3.170
Ireland 0.015 0.060 0.204 0.021 0.020 0.001 141.441 0.251
Israel 0.188 −0.033 −0.089 0.004 0.004 0.000 2.111 −0.053
Italy −0.028 0.027 0.063 0.007 0.001 0.000 −25.604 0.640
Jamaica 0.434 −0.062 −0.173 0.033 0.013 0.001 7.515 −0.566
Japan −0.243 0.024 0.083 0.007 −0.005 0.000 −2.987 0.473
Jordan 1.285 −0.454 −1.512 −0.173 −0.042 −0.009 −13.458 0.581
Kazakhstan 0.151 −0.052 −0.126 −0.005 −0.011 0.001 −3.069 −0.832
Kenya −0.406 −1.442 −1.704 −2.016 −0.373 −0.064 496.137 3.735
Korea, Rep. −0.022 −0.018 0.027 −0.018 −0.009 −0.001 81.391 −3.708
Kuwait −0.161 −0.039 0.134 −0.058 −0.032 −0.007 36.260 −5.053
Kyrgyzstan 2.706 −0.765 −2.981 −0.099 −0.030 −0.005 −3.672 0.157
Laos 4.604 −1.172 −3.620 −0.032 −0.016 −0.001 −0.701 0.019
Latvia 0.181 0.007 −0.103 0.017 0.010 0.001 9.252 −0.911
Lebanon 0.789 −0.354 −0.606 −0.304 −0.030 −0.005 −38.550 0.827
Lesotho 2.093 −0.526 −1.918 0.231 −0.064 0.030 11.053 −1.576
Libya 0.124 0.010 −0.071 0.019 0.006 0.005 15.659 −6.472
Lithuania 0.127 −0.001 −0.106 0.007 0.003 0.001 5.370 −0.678
Madagascar 7.171 −1.669 −3.732 0.093 −0.005 0.006 1.290 −0.151
Malawi 10.112 −2.688 −5.767 0.088 −0.230 0.033 0.870 −0.569
Mali 11.129 −2.981 −3.810 0.109 −0.226 0.016 0.977 −0.412
Mauritania 2.313 −0.688 −5.024 −0.095 −0.058 −0.007 −4.116 0.143
Mexico 0.105 0.005 −0.012 0.024 0.016 0.001 22.634 −6.121
Moldova 1.119 −0.314 −1.846 −0.027 −0.018 −0.001 −2.424 0.059
Mongolia 1.398 −0.368 −2.635 −0.010 −0.008 −0.000 −0.705 0.002
Morocco 0.709 −0.179 −0.478 −0.025 −0.006 −0.001 −3.592 0.253
Mozambique 8.444 −2.223 −7.156 −0.156 −0.098 0.003 −1.853 −0.038
Namibia 1.115 −0.414 −0.965 −0.008 −0.097 0.010 −0.680 −0.988
Nepal 5.500 −1.421 −2.079 −0.009 −0.043 0.002 −0.171 −0.084
Netherlands −0.056 0.061 0.274 0.021 0.008 0.003 −37.571 1.127
New Zealand −0.103 0.030 0.087 −0.015 0.001 −0.001 14.628 −1.121
Nicaragua 3.807 −0.951 −3.953 0.009 −0.013 0.003 0.247 −0.081
Niger 10.439 −2.660 −4.548 −0.080 −0.112 0.007 −0.771 −0.146
Nigeria 0.621 −0.228 −0.583 −0.046 −0.033 −0.001 −7.350 0.226
North 0.752 −0.268 −1.037 −0.059 −0.036 −0.003 −7.785 0.248
Macedonia
Norway −0.314 0.169 0.402 0.036 0.024 0.002 −11.638 0.424
Oman 0.042 −0.056 −0.151 −0.026 −0.018 −0.002 −61.264 1.447
Pakistan 1.501 −0.443 −0.575 −0.056 −0.032 −0.001 −3.728 0.098
Panama −0.141 −0.064 −0.083 −0.149 −0.029 −0.009 105.473 11.187
Papua New 1.494 −0.331 −2.257 0.016 0.011 0.001 1.079 −0.047
Guinea
Paraguay 0.261 −0.136 −0.252 −0.070 −0.023 −0.003 −26.995 1.166
Peru 0.420 −0.109 −0.183 0.009 −0.008 0.001 2.135 −0.637
Philippines 0.171 −0.022 −0.186 0.020 0.006 0.002 11.906 −1.212
Poland 0.213 −0.001 −0.073 0.026 0.011 0.001 12.195 −1.930
(continued)
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TABLE A4
Continued
Estimates used: γ = 0.357 δB = 3.161(1 − Comm.Lang.)(1 − Colony)(1 − RT A)
Scenario 1 (in %) Scenario 2 (in %) Comparison (in %)
tf0jkt = tfjkt∀k, j; tf0jkt = tfjkt∀k, j





















Portugal −0.018 0.047 0.086 0.018 0.006 0.001 −98.478 0.940
Romania 0.112 −0.030 −0.084 −0.024 −0.004 −0.002 −21.253 2.101
Russia 0.088 −0.029 −0.039 −0.012 −0.007 −0.000 −14.056 1.134
Rwanda 26.690 −6.732 −6.867 −0.572 −0.488 0.035 −2.145 −0.511
Saudi Arabia −0.234 −0.002 0.280 −0.043 −0.026 −0.004 18.169 −1.330
Senegal 2.115 −1.662 −2.998 −1.577 −0.228 −0.048 −74.541 1.611
Serbia 1.248 −0.458 −1.143 −0.177 −0.039 −0.007 −14.165 0.620
Sierra Leone 14.172 −3.267 −6.992 0.308 −0.090 0.028 2.173 −0.397
Slovakia 0.098 0.019 −0.030 0.019 0.010 0.003 18.987 −9.569
Slovenia 0.005 −0.016 −0.023 −0.030 −0.010 −0.004 −600.966 17.744
South Africa −0.325 −0.231 −0.163 −0.355 −0.112 −0.021 109.236 12.587
Spain −0.072 0.057 0.108 0.024 0.003 0.001 −33.171 1.012
Sri Lanka 1.203 −0.279 −0.735 0.052 −0.007 0.004 4.297 −0.586
Sudan 3.140 −0.835 −1.307 0.046 −0.047 0.005 1.475 −0.396
Sweden −0.284 0.129 0.334 0.005 0.016 −0.001 −1.740 −0.334
Switzerland −0.101 0.046 0.148 −0.005 0.005 −0.001 5.278 −0.876
Taiwan 0.004 −0.010 0.021 −0.008 −0.003 −0.001 −172.690 −5.365
Tajikistan 2.500 −0.619 −2.438 0.042 −0.019 0.006 1.682 −0.260
Tanzania 8.266 −2.768 −3.699 −1.051 −0.209 −0.014 −12.715 0.371
Thailand −0.053 −0.033 −0.050 −0.039 −0.020 −0.005 72.993 10.676
Togo 0.731 −1.218 −3.151 −0.944 −0.320 −0.076 −129.118 2.422
Tunisia 0.430 −0.083 −0.437 −0.004 0.001 −0.001 −0.940 0.153
Turkey 0.060 −0.042 −0.025 −0.044 −0.013 −0.001 −73.294 5.165
Turkmenistan −0.043 −0.108 −0.159 −0.097 −0.043 −0.008 223.973 5.105
USA −0.106 0.026 0.056 0.008 0.000 0.000 −7.602 0.402
Uganda 8.159 −3.414 −4.052 −1.813 −0.390 −0.019 −22.221 0.465
Ukraine 0.022 −0.106 −0.246 −0.096 −0.036 −0.010 −439.523 3.986
UAEs −0.243 −0.075 0.138 −0.102 −0.052 −0.011 41.809 −8.209
UK −0.179 0.080 0.138 0.011 0.007 0.000 −5.862 0.182
Uruguay 0.111 −0.077 −0.048 −0.035 −0.020 −0.001 −31.863 1.601
Uzbekistan 0.350 −0.197 −0.324 −0.095 −0.034 −0.004 −27.100 1.131
Venezuela 0.090 −0.031 −0.014 0.006 −0.004 0.001 6.296 −6.157
Vietnam 0.409 −0.116 −1.360 −0.008 −0.011 0.001 −1.960 −0.101
Yemen 0.881 −0.296 −0.900 −0.039 −0.032 −0.000 −4.391 0.036
Zambia 4.142 −1.619 −3.751 −0.295 −0.313 0.015 −7.133 −0.408
Zimbabwe 1.917 −0.943 −2.058 −0.258 −0.229 0.003 −13.475 −0.122
NOTES: General equilibrium results based on equations (16), (17) and (18) using
σ = 5. We report the difference in the respective statistics vis-à-vis the actual situation, for
aggregate exports (Xi), factory gate prices (pi) and welfare (W Fi). ΔXi./Xi. ≡X′i./Xi. −1,
Δpi./pi. ≡ p′i./pi. − 1 and ΔW Fi./W Fi. ≡ W F ′i./W Fi. − 1 denote the percentage difference
of the counterfactual value to the actual value for each variable.
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